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Abstract—Distributed antenna (DA) is considered as a strong
alternative to conventional centralized multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO), to provide a greener and user-centric net-
work structure. However, physical layer (PHY) security becomes
more challenging in DA systems because of the proximity to
the transmitters. In this paper, we jointly optimize DA acti-
vation/deactivation and secure precoding to minimize the total
power consumption, subjected to legitimate user’s (LU) quality-
of-service (QoS) and PHY security constraints against potential
eavesdroppers (Eves). A practical scenario is considered, where
channel state information (CSI) of all the nodes can only be im-
perfectly obtained. In the presence of infinite probabilities of CSI
uncertainties, a deterministic robust based algorithm is designed
to always satisfy LU’s QoS requirement and address PHY security
constraints against Eves. Moreover, essentially different from
existing artificial noise (AN)-aided secure transmission schemes,
where AN’ leakage effect at LU needs to be suppressed, we utilize
AN as a beneficial element at LU end while keeping it destructive
at potential Eves. Simulation results verify that, the proposed
algorithm incurs much lower power consumption compared to
its benchmarks, thanks to the additional degrees of freedom of
antenna selection and utilizing constructive AN. Last but not least,
by adaptively facilitating DA activation/deactivation, the proposed
algorithm addresses a user-centric network structure, which is
more flexible over the conventional centralized MIMO systems.
Index Terms—User centric systems, Physical layer security,
Constructive artificial noise, Secure Precoding, Antenna selection
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing interest in physical layer (PHY) security,
different techniques and signal processing approaches have
been extensively investigated [1]. Among them, centralized
antenna (CA) multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) has been
considered as a potential technique for enhancing PHY security
thanks to its high spatial diversity [2] [3]. However, it is
worth noting that, centralized MIMO requires high power
consumption caused by its fully activated radio-frequency (RF)
chains, which is against the green evolution proposed by the
next generation communication systems [4] [5]. Besides, since
all the antennas are co-located together, centralized MIMO
often suffers from an equal level of path loss (PL) from the
antenna array to one user, and edge users may not be well
served due to the severe propagation attenuation [6]. To alle-
viate the aforementioned problems, distributed antenna (DA)
systems have been proposed to achieve a green, user-centric
and flexible network structure. Explicitly, the geographically
positioned antennas help reduce the communication distance,
and hence transmission power can be eased. Since the power
consumption of an active DA node mainly comes from digi-
tal/analog converter, analog/digital converter, filter, synthesizer,
mixers, etc [8], the power consumption of a DA node can be
significantly reduced by switching it off [3]. By adaptively
activating those DAs contributing the most, DA systems can
provide on-demand service for users [7] [8].
Nevertheless, it should be pointed that due to the proximity to
transmitters, it is also easier for potential eavesdroppers (Eves)
to grasp the confidential messages intended for the legitimate
user (LU). Hence, PHY security in DA systems becomes more
challenging, and needs to be carefully addressed. In the past
few years, artificial noise (AN)-aided secure transmission has
been widely studied to jam Eves. In [9], AN was generated
into the orthogonal space of the LU’s channel, and thus the
potential Eves can be interfered by AN while its leakage is
zeroed at the LU. On the other hand, the authors in [10]
designed a scheme that AN can be spatially transmitted into
the direction of the Eves, on the basis of knowing the Eves’
channel state information (CSI). On the specific topic of secure
transmission in DA systems, the authors in [11] maximized the
ergodic secrecy rate in DA systems, where AN and confidential
signal are jointly designed and transmitted at each DA. In [3],
the power minimization problem was demonstrated for DA
systems, where the potential Eves are considered as idle LUs
and scavenge energy from AN. The authors in [12] maximized
the LU’s signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) require-
ment, subjected to PHY security constraint.
The aforementioned research, however, treated AN as a
harmful element and suppressed its leakage at the LU as much
as possible. If AN can be beneficial to the LU, based on the
concept of constructive interference (CI), it may help improve
the LU’s receiving performance. CI was firstly introduced
in code division multiple access system [13] [14] [15], and
subsequent research applied this technique into MIMO [16],
cognitive radio [17] [18] and constant envelop systems [19]
[20]. Based on the aforementioned work, the authors in [21]
proposed a scheme to utilize AN in a CA multiple-input single-
output (MISO) system, where AN at the transmitter was aligned
with the received signal at the LU. However, enormous power
consumption is incurred by the fully activated antennas [21].
Motivated by the aforementioned issues, we propose a joint
DA selection and secure precoding design to minimize total
power consumption for DA systems, under infinite probabilities
of CSI uncertainties. Our contributions are summarized in the
following:
• DA activation/deactivation and secure precoding are
jointly designed to fully utilize the additional degrees of
freedom in antenna selection and beneficial effect of con-
structive AN, which significantly reduces the total power
consumption yet addressing the LU’s SINR requirement
and PHY security constraints against the Eves.
• A robust power minimization oriented optimization prob-
lem is formulated, where CSI can only be imperfectly
obtained. In the presence of CSI error, a novel algorithm
is proposed to solve the optimization problem in terms of
deterministic robust optimization, where the LU’s SINR
and PHY security against the Eves are always guaranteed
with all the possible CSI uncertainties.
• A power efficient and user-centric network structure is
demonstrated by the proposed algorithm. Explicitly, the
working status of each DA is flexibly determined by the
LU and Eves’ positions to provide on-demand services: the
DAs close to users have higher probabilities of activation,
while the DAs far from users have higher probabilities of
being sleeping for saving power.
Notations: Matrices and vectors are represented by boldface
capital and lower case letters, respectively. | · | denotes the
absolute value of a complex scalar. AH AT , Tr(A), Rank(A)
denotes the Hermitian, transpose and trace of matrix A. Op-
erator diag (·) stacks the elements into a diagonal matrix.
A  0 means A is a positive semi-definite matrix. ‖ · ‖p
means the p-norm of a vector or a matrix. In means a n-by-n
identity matrix. Subscripts R and I represent the real part and
imaginary parts, respectively. CN×M and HN×M denote sets
of all N ×M matrices and Hermitian matrices with complex
entries. CN (a, b) denotes a normal distributed variable with
expectation a and variance b.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND CONSTRUCTIVE INTERFERENCE
In this section, system model is introduced in II-A and the
concept of CI is briefly discussed in II-B.
A. System Model
We consider a DA system at downlink. All N DA are
connected to a signal processing center through a noise-free
wired front-haul, where confidential messages are sent to the
LU in the presence of K potential Eves. The LU and Eves are
all equipped with single antenna for simplicity. CSI is obtained
by channel estimation in the training phase as in [22], and the
channels of all the nodes are given as
hu = hˆu + eu and hk = hˆk + ek, ∀k ∈ K, (1)
where the estimated channel between the DAs and the LU is
represented by hˆu ∈ CN×1 with estimation error eu. hˆk ∈
CN×1 denotes the estimated channel between the DAs and the
k-th Eve with estimation error ek. The element of error eu
follows CN{0, σ2u} while the element of error vector ek follows
CN{0, σ2k} [3].
B. Constructive Interference
CI is the interference pushes the received signals away from
the detection threshold [13]. Denote w ∈ CN×1 and a ∈ CN×1
as precoding and AN, respectively. Denote xu = uejφu as the
confidential symbol for the LU. The received signal at the LU
and the k-th Eve can be calculated as
yu = h
T
u (wxu + a) + nu, yk = h
T
k (wxu + a) + nk, (2)
where nu ∼ CN (0, σ2n) and nk ∼ CN (0, σ2n) denote the
Additive white Gaussian noises (AWGN) at the LU and the
k-th Eve, respectively. Accordingly, the received SINR at the
LU and k-th Eve are conventionally denoted as
Γu =
|hTuw|2
σ2n + |hTua|2 , Γk =
|hTkw|2
σ2n + |hTk a|2
, (3)
where Γu and Γk denote the LU and the k-th Eve’s SINR,
respectively. (3) indicates that AN is treated as an undesired
element at the LU, and hence its leakage needs to be minimized
at the LU. By contrast, the principle of constructive AN is to
align it with the desired signal at the LU. Since the transmitted
signal can be also written as (w+ae−jφu)xu, according to the
geometric interpretation in Fig. 1, the requirement of generating
constructive AN can be given as
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Fig. 1. Q-PSK modulation is utilized as an example. (a) Constructive artificial
noise for LU, where αR = <{hTuw + hTuae−jφu} and αI = ={hTuw +
hTuae
−jφu}. (b) Destructive artificial noise for potential Eves, where αR =
<{hTkw + hTk ae−jφu} and αI = ={hTkw + hTk ae−jφu}.
|={hTuw + hTuae−jφu}|
≤ (<{hTuw + hTuae−jφu} − σ
√
Γu)tanθ,
(4)
where θ = pi/M and M is constellation size [21]. As seen
from (4), AN is designed to be beneficial for the LU, and the
LU’ SINR Γu is also embedded.
Accordingly, the received SINR of the LU becomes into
γu =
|hTu (w + ae−jφu)|2
σ2n
, (5)
which indicates that the LU’s SINR is improved by utilizing
AN.
III. POWER MINIMIZATION WITH CSI UNCERTAINTIES
In section, we first formulate the optimization problem and
then present the solution.
A. Problem Formulation
Define ∆ as the channel estimation uncertainties set, which
contains all the possible CSI uncertainties and specifies an
ellipsoidal uncertainty region for the estimated CSI [23]. Define
wn as the n-th element of the precoding weight w ∈ CN×1.
Define an as the n-th AN element of the vector a ∈ CN×1.
Define t as DA selection vector , whose element tn = {0, 1}
indicates the n-th DA is activated or deactivated, respectively.
To minimize the total power consumption, we jointly optimize
vectors w, a and t. Accordingly, the problem is given as
P1 : argmin
w,a,t
||w + ae−jφu ||2
η
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
,
(C1) : 0 ≤ |wn + ane−jφu |2, ∀n ∈ N,
(C2) : |wn + ane−jφu |2 ≤ tnpDA,∀n ∈ N,
(C3) : min
eu∈∆
Γu ≥ Γu,
(C4) : max
ek∈∆
Γk ≤ Γk, k ∈ K,
(C5) : tn = {0, 1}, ∀n ∈ N,
(6)
where η denotes the drain efficiency at the DAs. Constraints
(C1) and (C2) denote the transmission power at each DA should
be non-negative and upper bounded by the maximum available
power pDA. Constraints (C3) and (C4) indicate deterministic
SINR requirement for the LU and PHY security constraints
against the Eves. Explicitly, the LU’s worst-case SINR should
be no smaller than the threshold Γu, while the Eves’ best-case
SINR should be lower than the PHY security threshold Γk,
with infinite probabilities of CSI uncertainties.
1) Optimization Solution: To solve optimization problem
P1, we first need to hand the constraints (C3) and (C4) that
contain infinite possibilities. Besides, AN should be construc-
tive to the LU while kept destructive to the Eves. According to
geometric interpretation in (4), constraints (C3) and (C4) are
equivalent to
(C3) : min
eu∈∆
: |={hTuw + hTuae−jφu}|
≤ (<{hTuw + hTuae−jφu} − σ
√
Γu)tanθ,
(C4) : max
ek∈∆
: |={hTkw + hTk ze−jφu}|
≥ (<{hTkw + hTk ae−jφu} − σ
√
Γk)tanθ,
(7)
We now first handle constraint (C3). Substituting hu = hˆu+
eu into (7), (C3) can be equivalently written as
(C3) min
eu∈∆
: |={(hˆu + eu)Tw + (hˆu + eu)Tae−jφu}| ≤
(<{(hˆu + eu)Tw + (hˆu + eu)Tae−jφu} − σ
√
Γu)tanθ,
(8)
Decomposing the real and imaginary parts, constraint (C3)
is equivalent to the following two inequalities

min
eu∈∆
σn
√
Γutanθ + ˆhI,usR + ˆhR,dsI + eI,usR + eR,usI
−( ˆhR,usR − ˆhI,usI + eR,dsR − eI,usI)tanθ ≤ 0,
min
eu∈∆
σn
√
Γutanθ − ˆhI,uuR − ˆhR,uuI − eR,usI − eI,usR
−( ˆhR,usR − ˆhI,usI + eR,usR − eI,usI)tanθ ≤ 0,
(9)
where w + ae−jφu = s.
The first inequality of (9) can be rewritten as
min
eu∈∆
[eI,u − eR,utanθ; eR,u + eI,utanθ]T [sR; sI ] + %u,1 ≤ 0.
(10)
where %u,1 = σn
√
Γutanθ+ ˆhI,usR+ ˆhR,usI− ˆhR,usRtanθ+
ˆhI,usItanθ. To handle the infinite CSI uncertainties in (10), we
transform (10) into a linear matrix inequality (LMI) using the
following Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 (S-Procedure): Let a function fm(x), m ∈ {1, 2},
be defined as
fm(x) = x
HAmx+ 2<{bHmx}+ cm (11)
where Am ∈ HN×N , bm ∈ CN×1 and cm ∈ R. The
implication f1(x) ⇒ f2(x) holds if and only if there exists
an λ ≥ 0 such that
λ
[
A1, b1
bH1 , c1
]
−
[
A2, b2
bH2 , c2
]
 0. (12)
To utilize S-procedure, we simply define
f1 = [
√
eI,u − eR,utanθ;
√
eR,u + eI,utanθ]
T I2N
[
√
eI,u − eR,utanθ;
√
eR,u + eI,utanθ] ≤ ξ2, and
f2 = [
√
eI,u − eR,utanθ;
√
eR,u + eI,utanθ]
Tdiag(sR; sI)
[
√
eI,u − eR,utanθ;
√
eR,u + eI,utanθ] + %u,1 ≤ 0.
According to S-procedure. The implication f1 ⇒ f2 holds if
and only if there exists λu,1 such that the LMI constraint in
(13) holds
[
λu,1I2N − diag(sR; sI), 0
0, −λu,1ξ2 − %u,1
]
 0,
and λu,1 ≥ 0,
(13)
As can be seen, a new variable ξ2 is introduced to represent
the bound of f1, which needs to be connected with the known
CSI error variance σ2u to make the problem solvable. Hence,
we further introduce Lemma 2 as follows.
Lemma 2 (links ξ2 to CSI error variance σ2u): The value of
ξ2 can be given as ξ2 = Φ−1(δ)
√
N(1 + tan2θ)σu to guar-
antee the term [
√
eI,u − eR,utanθ;
√
eR,u + eI,utanθ]
T I2N
[
√
eI,u − eR,utanθ;
√
eR,u + eI,utanθ] ≤ ξ2 satisfied with
probability δ, where δ can be set to close to 1, i.e. δ = 0.99
[25]. Proof: Please see Appendix A. 
Now with the value of ξ2, the first constraint in (9) con-
taining infinite possibilities of CSI uncertainties is transformed
into a deterministic LMI constraint. Now we handle the second
constraint in (9), which can be written as
[
λu,2I2N − diag(sR; sI), 0
0, −λu,2ξ2 − %u,2
]
 0,
and λu,2 ≥ 0,
(14)
where %u,2 = σn
√
Γutanθ− ˆhI,usR− ˆhR,usI− ˆhR,usRtanθ+
ˆhI,usItanθ, and ξ2 can be similarly calculated by Lemma
2. Now the constraint (C3) containing infinite possibilities is
transformed into two deterministic LMI inequalities in (13) and
(14), respectively. Now we handle the k-th Eve’s constraint in
(C4), which can be re-written as

max
ek∈∆
[eI,k + eR,ktanθ; eR,k − eI,ktanθ]T [sR; sI ] + %k,1 ≤ 0,
max
ek∈∆
[−eI,k + eR,ktanθ;−eR,k − eI,ktanθ]T [sR; sI ] + %k,2 ≤ 0
(15)
where %k,1 = ˆhI,ksR+ ˆhR,ksRtanθ+ ˆhR,ksI− ˆhI,ksItanθ−
σn
√
Γktanθ, and %k,2 = − ˆhI,ksR + ˆhR,ksRtanθ− ˆhR,ksI −
ˆhI,ksItanθ − σn
√
Γktanθ. Based on S-procedure introduced
above, (15) can be transformed into
[
λk,1I2N − diag(sR; sI), 0
0T −λk,1ζ2 − %k,1
]
,
[
λk,2I2N − diag(sR; sI), 0
0T −λk,2ζ2 − %k,2
]
and λk,1 ≥ 0, λk,2 ≥ 0.
(16)
where ζ2 = Φ−1(δ)
√
N(1 + tan2θ)σk according to Lemma 2.
Now the non-convex constraints (C3) and (C4) are replaced
by equivalent LMI constraints. Defining S = ssH , the problem
can be transformed as
P2 : argmin
s,t
Tr(S)
η
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
,
s.t. (C1) : Tr(SFn) ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N,
(C2) : Tr(SFn) ≤ tnpDA,∀n ∈ N,
(C3) : (13) and (14), (C4) : (16), ∀k ∈ K,
(C5) : tn = {0, 1}, ∀n ∈ N,
(C6) :
[
S s
sT 1
]
 0,
(17)
where Fn = diag(0...0︸︷︷︸
n−1
, 1, 0, ...0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−n
) is an auxiliary diagonal
matrix whose elements are zero except the n-th element,
∀k ∈ K. Besides, we notice constraint (C6) guarantees that
S is a semi-positive matrix, and hence Tr(SFn) ≥ 0 always
holds, ∀n ∈ N . As a result, we can drop the constraint (C1)
to reduce the complexity. Now the difficulty lies in the binary
constraint in (C5), which evidently equals to
(C5a) : tn = [0, 1],∀n ∈ N,
(C5b) :
N∑
n=1
tn −
N∑
n=1
t2n ≤ 0.
(18)
where (C5a) is the relaxed version of the original constraint,
and (C5b) confines the value of tn close to 0 or 1. Introducing
a penalty factor ϕ, typically of large value, and moving (C5b)
into the objective function, the objective becomes into
Tr(S)
α
+∑N
n=1
(
tnpon+(1−tn)poff
)
+ϕ
(∑N
n=1 tn−
∑N
n=1 t
2
n
)
, which
shares the same optimal design policy and result with the
original problem [24]. The last difficulty lies in the non-convex
term ϕ(
∑N
n=1 tn −
∑N
n=1 t
2
n) in the objective term. It can be
observed that
∑N
n=1 tn −
∑N
n=1 t
2
n is the difference of two
convex functions w.r.t the variable tn, and thus can be handled
by successive convex approximation such that
∑N
n=1 tn −∑N
n=1 t
2
n ≤
∑N
n=1 tn −
∑N
n=1(t
(i)
n )2 − 2∑Nn=1 t(i)n (tn − t(i)n ),
where t(i)n denotes the value of tn at the i-th iteration [22].
Therefore, the optimization becomes into
P3 : argmin
s,t
Tr(S)
η
+
N∑
n=1
(
tnpon + (1− tn)poff
)
+ ϕ
( N∑
n=1
tn −
N∑
n=1
(t(i)n )
2 − 2
N∑
n=1
t(i)n (tn − t(i)n )
)
,
s.t. (C2), (C3), (C4), (C5a) : tn ∈ [0, 1], (C6).
(19)
Now the deterministic robust optimization is summarized in
Algorithm 1. To tighten the approximation, we update the value
of t(i)n in each iteration. The successive convex approximation
serves as the upper bound of the original problem, which is
iteratively minimized and also lower bounded by the SINR
and PHY security constraints. Hence, the convergence of the
algorithm is confirmed. Finally, the solver for P3 in (19) is
summarized as follows.
Algorithm 1 DA deterministic robust optimization algorithm
(DA-det)
Input: SINR requirements Γu and Γk. Estimated channel
hˆu, hˆk, ∀k ∈ K. Power consumption related parameters
η, pon, poff , pDA.
Output: Optimal precoding s and DAs activation/deactivation
t.
1: repeat
2: Solve optimization problem P3 in (19).
3: Update t(i)n = tn,∀ n ∈ N .
4: i = i+ 1.
5: until Convergence
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
Simulated performance is presented in this section. The
number of the Eves K = 2. The LU’s SINR requirement is
set to Γd = 20 dB, while Eves’ SINR should be lower than
Γk = −10 dB to address PHY security. Power consumption
related parameters are set to η = 40%, pon = 500 mW,
poff = 50 mW, and pDA = 1000 mW, respectively. The PL
model in [6] is adopted. The central frequency is set to 2 GHz
with 1 MHz bandwidth. The AWGN power spectral density
is -174 dBm/Hz. N = 16 DAs are uniformly fixed across a
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Fig. 2. Impact of the CSI estimation error on the total power consumption.
100×100 m2 square cell [22]. The LU and Eves are randomly
distributed across the map. To highlight how users’ positions
affect DAs’ working modes, the LU and Eves are placed at the
coverage edge in Fig. 3, Besides, we select the most related
systems as benchmarks. a) CA MISO system without antenna
selection (CA-no-AS) [21]. b) DA system with conventional
AN (DA-conv-AN) [3].
Fig. 2 shows the CSI estimation error vs. the total power con-
sumption. As can be seen, the proposed algorithm outperforms
the two benchmarks, and reason is threefold: a) Benefiting
from the antenna selection mechanism, the DAs far from the
users may be deactivated for saving power, and thus a user-
centric and on-demand network structure is obtained by the
proposed algorithm. b) AN is rotated to be constructive even
with imperfect CSI, which also endorses less transmission
power to achieve a target SINR performance. c) Because of
the geographically distributed DAs, the distances between the
DAs and users are shortened and the system can always find
near DAs to serve the users. With the alleviated PL as well as
the lower required transmission power, DA can outperform the
CA system in terms of power efficient transmission. Besides,
the power consumption of all the algorithms increases with a
higher CSI error. Explicitly, the deterministic manner robust
optimization needs to keep the positive semi-definite charac-
teristic for the matrices in Eqs. (13), (14) and (16). This math-
ematically requires that all the leading principal minors in the
matrices nonnegative. Hence, with a higher CSI uncertainty, the
amplitude of precoder (also the transmission power) needs to
be property increased. As a result, the total power consumption
increases in a tough CSI estimation scenario.
Fig. 3 shows how antennas’ modes (activation or deactiva-
tion) are affected by the users’ positions. To highlight the user-
centric network structure provided by the proposed algorithm,
the users in Fig. 3(a) are placed at edge area. As can be seen
from Fig. 3(b) that, those DAs close to the users have higher
probabilities of working while other DAs far from the users
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Fig. 3. (a) DAs and users deployment, where black cross indicates the DAs.
Red and blue dots indicate the Eves and LU, respectively. (b) Impact of the
Eves and LU’ positions on antennas’ modes in DA systems.
Fig. 4. The probabilities of the received symbols of the LU and Eves falling
into constructive and destructive regions, where red dots denote the received
symbols of the Eves and blue dots denote the received symbols of the LU.
have higher probabilities of being deactivated to save power.
This is because in terms of power efficient design, letting those
DAs far from the users transmit signal is not power efficient
due to the severe propagation attenuation. As can be expected,
since no antenna selection is involved in [21], all antennas are
activated ignoring the users’ positions.
Fig. 4 shows the probabilities of the received symbols of
the LU and Eves falling into different regions. Since infinite
possibilities of CSI uncertainties are presented in an imperfect
channel estimation scenario, we need to transform constraints
(C3) and (C4) into equivalent LMIs. Simulation results verify
our analysis that by using S-procedure, the LU’ received sym-
bol always fall into constructive region confined by constraint
(C3), while the Eves’ symbols always fall into destructive
region confined by constraint (C4). As a result, the robustness
of the proposed algorithm is guaranteed.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a novel power efficient algorithm for DA
systems by jointly optimizing antenna activation/deactivation
and precoding, which significantly reduces the total power
consumption compared to the two benchmarks in [3] and [21].
In the presence of infinite probabilities of CSI uncertainties,
the LU’s QoS requirement and the PHY security against the
Eves can be always guaranteed, which indicates the robustness
of the proposed algorithm. Moreover, since DAs can flexibly
adjust their working modes thanks to the enhanced degree of
freedom, the proposed algorithm also facilitates a more flexible
and user-centric network structure over the two benchmarks in
[3] and [21]. At last, the performance of the proposed algorithm
has been verified by our simulation results.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Since the element of CSI error vector eu follows normal
distribution such that CN (0, σ2u), the element of real part eR,u
and imaginary part eI,u follows CN (0, σ
2
u
2 ). Hence, f1 can be
expanded as (1 + tanθ)eI,u+ (1− tanθ)eR,u ≤ ξ2, which can
be approximately seen as the probability distribution function
(pdf) of a normal distributed variable such that
Pr{(1 + tanθ)eI,u + (1− tanθ)eR,u ≤ ξ2} = δ, (20)
where δ physically represents the probability of Eq. (20) can
be satisfied. The value of δ can be set to close to 1, i.e. δ =
0.99, meaning (20) is satisfied with high probability. Since we
know the term (1 + tanθ)eI,u + (1 − tanθ)eR,u in Eq. (20)
follows CN (0, Nσ2u(1+tanθ2)). By normalizing it into a stand
normal distributed variable, (20) can be written as a cumulative
distribution function (cdf) as Φ{ ξ2√
N(1+tan2θ)
} = δ, where Φ(·)
is the cdf of a standard normal distributed variable. Defining
Φ−1(·) as the inverse function of Φ(·), finally we get
ξ2 = Φ−1(δ)σu
√
N(1 + tan2θ), (21)
and the value ζ2 (linked to the Eves’ CSI error variance σk)
can be calculated similarly.
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